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Abstract This paper examines how to best be with
women during birth, based on a phenomenological
description of the birth experience. The first part of the
paper establishes birth as an uncanny experience, that is, an
experience that is not only entirely unfamiliar, but even
unimaginable. The way in which birth happens under
unknowable circumstances (in terms of when, how, with
whom…) creates a set of anxieties on top of the funda-
mental anxiety that emerges from the existential paradox
by which it does not seem possible for a body to give birth
to another body. Would homebirth provide a remedy to the
uncanniness? The result yielded by medical studies is
confirmed by the phenomenological perspective taken
here: homebirth might be reassuring for some, but not for
everybody; choice of birth place is important. Once the
birth process starts happening, another layer of strangeness
is added: it turns out to be an experience of radical pas-
sivity and waiting, normally. The question thus becomes
how to best care for somebody who is exposed to uncan-
niness, passivity, and waiting. Martin Heidegger’s concepts
of care and discourse prove useful in examining how to
facilitate rather than interrupt this process. It becomes
necessary to think beyond verbal communication towards a
wider concept of communication that involves silence and
intercorporeality. Birth requires a special kind of being-
with as being-there.
Keywords Care  Childbirth  Homebirth  Passivity 
Waiting  Heidegger  Discourse  Communication
The birth process is undoubtedly a very unusual experi-
ence. This experience will be approached here from the
phenomenological perspective, meaning that a description
of the experience or of what it is like to give birth will
be attempted. The purpose of this description is to
explore how to best be with a woman who is giving
birth.
The phenomenological description yields strangeness or
unfamiliarity as the pervasive character of the experience.
While this result is not as such surprising, it will be helpful
to examine this strangeness more closely with respect to its
different dimensions. Such differentiation will make it
possible to see how even the more mundane dimensions of
the experience become affected by the fundamental
uncanniness of birth as an experience that is unimaginable.
Furthermore, the uncanniness of birth is exacerbated by the
fact that passivity and waiting are normally a crucial part of
the process. The question thus becomes how to best be
there for somebody who is exposed to passivity and
uncanniness.
In caring for a woman (or couple) undergoing this
uncanny experience, it is significant to consider the radical
clash between the perspective of the woman facing this
experience for the first time (or, if not first, in any case as
something that always remains unknown) whereas the
midwife undergoes this experience from the outside every
day. Taking the other’s perspective is thus crucial. But at
the same time, if the care works out well, caring for
somebody in such a limit situation can make the carer
appear like an angel: a super-human guide and guardian. In
the best case scenario, midwives reassure us that miracles
(or what seems like one due to its inconceivable character)
are possible. In the worst case scenario, they can make us
wanting to escape: from the situation and from our bodies,
neither of which is possible.
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There are several factors contributing to a good birth
experience, and our focus here lies especially with the
situational and communicative ones. If the character of the
experience is determined by uncanniness, one possible
response appears to be homebirth, or making oneself at
home to counter-act the strangeness of the experience. In
the case of homebirth, midwives are crucial. Yet it turns
out that if the relationship between midwife and mother or
couple works well in terms of communicating within and
responding to the situation, the question of place becomes
secondary: a caring midwife can make us feel at home in
such a way as to override the surrounding circumstances.
While choice of birthplace is important, the quality of care
is more important for alleviating fears than the question of
home versus hospital.
An uncanny encounter
Any pregnant woman will to some extent imagine the birth
process. That is a normal attempt at coping with an unfa-
miliar experience, and it is a useful attempt since it helps
making some crucial decisions, including the decision as to
where this experience should take place. Our first step will
be a closer exploration of the dimensions of strangeness
that characterises birth.
(a) When the birth happens is unknown. From a certain
point of pregnancy onwards, it could be basically
any day, any moment. There is thus a constant sense
of uncertainty which makes itself present especially
around any deviations from the everyday, such as
travels.1
(b) Where the birth happens is unpredictable, and yet
needs to be pre-selected. In other words, it is
necessary to decide between the locally available
possibilities (hospitals, birth centres or birth houses,
homebirth) while still bearing in mind that in the
end, it might nonetheless be an entirely different
place. A birth that starts at home might be moved to
the hospital, a planned hospital birth might end up
happening at home, and that is not to mention more
unusual locations like vehicles of transportation.
(c) Who will be present is uncertain, and yet very much
worth pondering. For example, if the father is
supposed to be present, it is worth imagining and
discussing whether both sides are comfortable with
this, and what his role would be, bearing in mind
again that there are limits to anticipating the actual
course of events. A major factor of uncertainty
concerns the health professionals present: normally,
midwives. Under most circumstances, the midwives
encountered in the situation will be strangers, and it
is worth mentally preparing for this.2
(d) The gender of those present is unknown, and
especially of healthcare professionals: a male mid-
wife would initially be a shock to most birth-giving
women.
(e) How the birth happens is unforeseeable. Will the
process be long or short? Will it require medical
interventions or not? There are lots of unknowns, and
some of them deserve imaginative engagement. For
example, does a water birth seem desirable or not? If
the process is prolonged, where and how should the
waiting happen?What would my ideal birth look like,
and what is completely unfathomable for me? How
can these findings be conveyed in a birth plan?Despite
the need and usefulness of planning, there are many
dimensions that remain unforeseeable since I cannot
anticipate what my body will feel like during the
process, and to what extent this undermines my
previous intentions and plans.
(f) How the birth will be possible is unimaginable. In
addition to the factors of ‘how’ mentioned under (e),
there is a deeper dimension to the unforeseeableness
of how the birth will happen. This is not a matter of
how exactly will it happen, as in the previous point,
but more a ‘how on earth will it happen’? The most
fundamental problem is that birth as an event is
unimaginable. I cannot imagine my body giving
birth, I cannot imagine that such an event is possible.
And even after it has happened to a person once or
more, there is still some level on which the
experience remains inconceivable.
Birth is a paradox of sorts because it is in some sense
impossible (namely, unimaginable) and yet at the same
time, entirely possible (because we know it happens all the
time). At this point, the unimaginable character of birth
will be explored further with the help of Martin Heideg-
ger’s concept of the uncanny that elucidates how humans
tend to deal with uncanniness— namely, by creating higher
levels thereof. Heidegger explains this tendency through a
1 Speaking from personal example or auto-ethnographic observation:
it was because of this uncertainty around the ‘when’ that I had to
overcome my resistance to mobile phones during my first pregnancy.
For any subsequent pregnancy, the need to create alternative
arrangements for the older sibling(s) enhances the sense of
uncertainty.
2 In relation to the discussion of homebirth, this fact will play an
important role (see below). There are countries where a midwife can
be selected beforehand, such as Germany; yet even so, there are
limitations: not only is this usually an expensive option, but there
even still remains some unpredictability since the midwife might be
with a different woman at the time, or otherwise unavailable, which is
again a function of the ‘when’ being unpredictable. By and large, it
thus holds true that the midwife is another unknown factor.
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line from Sophocles’s ancient tragedy Antigone. In the first
choral ode of Antigone, the nature of the human is desig-
nated as the most uncanny (Greek deinon) among many
uncanny things. Our relation to uncanniness is relevant
because it is a dynamic one. We experience the world as
uncanny on some basic level because we did not bring it
about, but were born or ‘thrown’ into it, and into a par-
ticular time and space, without ever being able to fully
grasp this uncanny world. However, we do not stop at this
encounter with the world as uncanny, but try to make
ourselves at home in the midst of this uncanniness. As we
do so, we create higher levels of uncanniness. We strive to
make ourselves at home in the midst of that which over-
whelms us, and yet, we ourselves have a tendency to
overstep the boundaries of the familiar. In this respect,
human nature is excessive. Humans surpass ‘‘the limits of
the homely’’ (Heidegger 2000, p. 161). According to Hei-
degger, this excessive nature is best characterized by the
Greek term techne, translated as craft, power, or violence.
One of the most important overwhelming powers
against which humans react by creating higher levels of
uncanniness is nature. In the choral ode, nature is repre-
sented by natural elements like the earth and the sea, which
have inexhaustible energies and confront us with their
waves, circles, and cycles. Exposed in this fashion, we do
not give up; we rise to the challenge, making ourselves at
home in the midst of that which overpowers us. One crucial
manifestation of our link to nature that confronts us with
uncanniness is illness. Illness will be used here as a general
example for uncanniness; this is not to imply in any way
that pregnancy is an illness (yet childbirth as well as illness
involve healthcare professionals). Illness means that our
bodies fail us, as it were, and become affected in detri-
mental ways by internal or external factors. Illness is par-
ticularly uncanny because the affected individual normally
does not understand it (at least not fully), yet depending on
the extent of the illness, it can affect our existence wholly
and to its core. The craft or techne that humans engage to
fight illness is medicine which was known already to the
ancients, but began taking on its natural scientific shape in
the seventeenth century. Medicine thrived in the twentieth
century, and it was at that time that births started taking
place in hospitals.
When the possibility of giving birth in a hospital became
historically a widespread possibility, this certainly meant a
significant reduction of fatalities for birth-giving women as
well as for infants. Yet at the same time, it created a new
level of uncanniness, in line with Heidegger’s description
of the human tendency to evoke higher levels of uncanni-
ness in combating previous uncanny phenomena. Medicine
in general fits the Heideggerian description as a higher
level of uncanniness that replicates some of the features
which make illness so uncanny. Just as we do not usually
understand illness, we also tend to not comprehend medical
treatments. Medical professionals are not always eager to
explain, and the facts are usually quite complicated indeed.
Yet at the same time, medicine affects our existence fun-
damentally. When I ‘take’ my body to the doctor and
experience discomfort at the realization that she might
indeed only be interested in my body as a physical object,
this unease creates an opportunity for the phenomenolog-
ical discovery that I am my body rather than merely having
a body, and that my body is lived and experienced rather
than a merely physical body.
It will not be possible to examine here the character of
medicine in general and possibilities of remedying the
discomfort often felt in the face of its uncanniness. Yet the
topic has some direct implications for birth. The pain
involved in the process and the possibility of complications
create an affinity between childbirth and illness, but at the
same time, it is often and rightfully pointed out that birth is
not as such a medical condition and should not be treated in
this fashion. Particularly in terms of uncanniness, the
hospital atmosphere can be fear-inducing rather than fear-
alleviating.3 There has been a general tendency to create a
‘homey’ atmosphere in maternity wards and remove or
conceal equipment of medical technology as much as
possible. Nonetheless, a hospital is a hospital, and the
desire to return to homebirths is indicative of this
awareness.
How do homebirths fare when it comes to uncanniness?
An important 2011 study of the UK situation conducted by
Peter Brocklehurst showed that homebirths do not increase
the likelihood of birth complications. However, the case of
women giving birth for the first time (‘‘nulliparous’’) dif-
fers from that of women who have given birth at least once
before (‘‘multiparous’’). For nulliparous women, the danger
of stillbirths and perinatal injuries were slightly, but indeed
only minimally,4 increased for homebirths; for multiparous
women, they were not. Yet the most substantial difference
between nulliparous and multiparous women concerned
transfers to hospital which were necessary for about 40 %
of nulliparous women (vs.*10 % of multiparous women).
For both groups, the likelihood of medical interventions
was significantly lower in the case of homebirths.
Brocklehurst thus concludes that his ‘‘results support a
policy of offering healthy women with low risk pregnan-
cies a choice of birthsetting’’ including homebirths and
non-obstetric midwifery units (Brocklehurst 2011, p. 1).
3 Yet it can also be fear-alleviating for those who find the presence of
medical equipment comforting, and generally, we will come to
conclude that the quality of care matters more than the birth-setting,
as far as alleviating fears is concerned.
4 In this study, there were 5.3 of such incidences in 1000 births for
obstretic units versus 9.3 for home, both for nulliparous women. The
adjusted odds ratio thus comes to 1.75.
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Brocklehurst’s recommendation coincides with the phe-
nomenological perspective because being able to choose
the most desirable situational context for the uncanny
experience of birth can be very helpful. On the basis of the
phenomenological exploration undertaken here, it appears
that imagining the birth situation is a useful exercise,
despite the aforementioned limitations of such thought
experiments. One of the most important decisions to be
made concerns the location or ‘where’ of birth, and being
given a choice already contributes to a sense of participa-
tion rather than determination from the outside.
Perhaps the phenomenological perspective developed
here points in the direction of a homebirth? Yes and no.
Initially, it might seem that one’s home was the preferable
place for an uncanny experience since an unfamiliar space
increases the sense of strangeness. Furthermore, a hospital
with medical technology might evoke an uncanny atmo-
sphere from the outset. Yet already the fact that more than
a third of all nulliparous women who planned a homebirth
need to be transferred to the hospital shows that the situ-
ation is more complex. Brocklehurst’s study is purely
quantitative. This has the advantage of high reliability for
the English context since data from all participating NHS
units between April 1st 2008 and April 30th 2010 was
considered. Yet at the same time, due to the quantitative
nature and complete lack of interviews, the study provides
no explanations or interpretations. Indirect results from
qualitative studies on birth in general5 along with common
sense yield three general categories of reasons for these
transfers: medical reasons (i.e., the need for medical
interventions, including caesarians and forceps deliver);
pain relief (epidural); psychological reasons. Psychological
reasons include fear and anxiety, and they can contribute to
a need for medical or pain relief interventions. In turn,
being in a home environment which makes medical inter-
ventions and epidurals impossible can certainly enhance
fear and anxiety. As one of my colleagues once put it:
‘‘Call me a wuss, but I like to be around life-saving
equipment when I give birth!’’
At the same time, the data provided by Brocklehurst
with the almost null difference in detrimental results shows
that the decision for a homebirth creates very little actual
risk, and for multiparous women, actually no risk at all, but
a smaller likelihood of interventions. In that sense, the
difference might well be a psychological or ‘felt’ one.
Midwives who arrive for a homebirth carry life-saving
equipment, and in that sense, even somebody who prefers
to be around life-saving equipment when giving birth does
not need to exclude homebirths. Yet from a phenomeno-
logical perspective, the ‘felt’ difference which is
undoubtedly a factor in transfers from home to hospital
must not be neglected. Among the likely reasons would be
the realization that there is more pain involved than
anticipated, but also that the birth-giving body feels dif-
ferent and more alien than presumed. It should also be
acknowledged that midwives coming to the house normally
work in shifts, and when a shift is over, there are new
midwives taking over just as it would be the case in a
hospital. Furthermore, in addition to the possibility to be
transferred into hospital for the birth, which we have seen
to be a frequent occurrence for first time mothers, there is
the risk of needing to be transferred after the birth, for
repairs (e.g., episiotomy), which is more disruptive to the
mother-infant-bonding experience than being in a hospital
to begin with. It should also be noted that homebirth is only
safe for the infant in countries where transferring the infant
to a hospital for any complications or concerns is easy and
fast.
Yet there are other factors as well, and some of them
might well be open to change while others can be antici-
pated beforehand by an exercise in the imagination. One
aspect of birth that is crucial and yet often neglected is the
significance of waiting. It is a common yet mistaken
assumption that the birth process simply gets more and
more difficult as it advances. Rather, the final phase is often
easier than the previous one, already because the end of the
process is coming tangibly closer and because being able to
participate (by ‘pushing’) is in certain ways easier than
passively waiting. The significant role of waiting makes it
advantageous to prepare for some entertainment or other
accessories. That is where the home context seems to
provide many advantages; yet an often disregarded factor
needs to also be taken into account: midwives. In general,
if the preference for the home is motivated by the desire to
maintain a familiar context and atmosphere in preparation
for an uncanny encounter or experience, it must be noted
that the arrival of midwives into the home context will in
any case mean an encounter with strangers. Only under
exceptional circumstances will the midwife be a familiar
one6; in imagining the situation, it should thus be imagined
as an encounter with a stranger.
5 See esp. Thomson et al. (2011).
6 In the UK context, the midwife will only by chance be the same
midwife who provided antenatal care, or else, the pregnant woman
would need to sign up for a private independent midwifery service
rather than NHS midwives. These tend to be costly and are not
available in all areas.
The expense of having familiar midwives attend homebirths differs
from country to country, and can also change radically, as in Germany
where a change in insurance provision suddenly doubled the expense
and thus made homebirth much less feasible as an option. In the UK,
the President of the Royal College of Midwives, Lesley Page, has
been lobbying for what she calls ‘‘1–1 birthcare’’ for a long time, and
it seems clearly outside of the possibilities of the National Health
Service.
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Admitting a stranger into my home creates a situation
that calls for hospitality, as we learn from Jacques Der-
rida,7 but also from common sense. Such hospitality is
certainly noticeable and concerns mundane dimensions
such as sustenance,8 but also the choice of entertainment.9
Furthermore, if the ‘guests’ are behaving in a disruptive
fashion, their presence in the home becomes more notice-
able than in a neutral setting. It might seem strange that
such mundane hospitality would have any impact on the
birth experience. Yet if we consider the tension between
mundane and much deeper existential dimensions that
determines the birth situation in general (on the affective
level as well as otherwise), this influence might become
more understandable. The confrontation with an uncanny
experience in a mundane setting can make certain aspects
of that setting entirely irrelevant, but other aspects might
suddenly become more problematic or pressing. Being
sociable, communicative, or hospitable is difficult under
the circumstances.
Moreover, the tension between mundane and funda-
mental levels plays out for hospitality as well. There is a
level of fundamental hospitality involved in the birth
experience.10 This fundamental hospitality designates the
need for me to let the midwife take care of my body as my
most basic and irreplaceable home. It requires me to trust
her and let her enter this home of mine, in the general, but
also in the literal sense. If there are problems on the level of
mundane hospitality, it also becomes more difficult to
achieve this fundamental hospitality. In other words, even
though concerns on the level of mundane hospitality might
appear trivial, they can be disruptive in relation to the more
fundamental level of giving the midwife access to my
body, especially since such a major existential situation is
at stake here.
When it comes to an imaginative engagement with
homebirths, hospitality thus needs to be part of the
imaginative scenario as well as the potential need to be
transferred. However, if the decision is nonetheless for a
homebirth, the possibility of transfer should in the situ-
ation itself better not be too much on the woman’s mind.
Considering other options creates a general atmosphere
of uncertainty or indecisiveness that is unhelpful. One of
the biggest advantages of homebirth is the possibility to
stay put, in all senses. Once the baby is born, everybody
is immediately there, home, where they can stay, recover,
and celebrate together—and the home is home again, just
even more so, substantially enriched by the new arrival.
Overall, we have seen that there can be advantages as
well as disadvantages to a homebirth, and the need for an
imaginative engagement with birth thus gets confirmed.
Such exercises in imagination should also include a
dimension of birth that is crucial yet often neglected, partly
due to the temptation to focus immediately on the crucial
point of the process: the actual birth, that is, the appearance
of the baby. But a substantial part of the process is deter-
mined by passivity and waiting, and those are difficult to
deal with in their own right, but even more so when waiting
for something fundamentally uncanny to happen.
Passivity and waiting
Passivity is something we neither value nor consider much.
A phenomenological description of birth shows that this is
a mistake. However, when we initially explore birth, the
same inhibitions emerge that determine our relation to
passivity in general. Just like it is a negative characteristic
to describe somebody as ‘‘passive’’, there is also an
impression that a more active engagement is conducive to
giving birth. The ‘‘Active Birthing’’ movement symbolises
this conviction. Passivity in birth is usually associated with
hospital births and more precisely, medicalised birth. By
contrast, qualitative research on birth as inspired by exis-
tential phenomenology tends to focus on the woman as
‘‘subject’’ rather than treated ‘‘object,’’ where ‘‘subject’’ is
often interpreted in terms of autonomy and activity.11
The existential phenomenology of birth presented in this
article places an emphasis on passivity and thus counters
the everyday as well as current research emphasis on
activity in birth. This is not to deny but merely to sup-
plement the significance of active birth. A few preparatory
clarifications are in place. Firstly, a general reminder
7 See Derrida (2000).
8 This dimension is explicitly mentioned in the NHS guidelines for
homebirths, and while the recommendation to provide a snack
initially seems unproblematic, this can well change under the birth
circumstances. (Auto-ethnographic observation: I did not appreciate
having my partner prepare tea and snacks in the kitchen while I
wanted to have him around for back massage during contractions).
9 Auto-ethnographic observation: I felt obligated to switch the TV off
(even though I had identified a good episode of ‘Monk’ with my
favourite assistant of his, Sharona) when the midwives arrived, partly
because I felt it would otherwise have been hospitable to ask about
entertainment preferences, and I was not in a position to discuss my
programme choices. Plus, when there is the possibility or actuality of
examination, visual entertainment also feels out of place.
10 Derrida explores ‘‘unconditional’’ hospitality, in contrast to
‘‘conditional’’ hospitality. His terms operate somewhat differently,
especially since unconditional hospitality designates a kind of general
and absolute welcome, irrespective of where the stranger is coming
from. For the relationship discussed in the current article, the stranger
would always be a midwife and thus not a stranger in the most
universal sense. At the same time, there are certain parallels between
fundamental hospitality as discussed here and unconditional hospi-
tality in Derrida’s sense; for example, both are in some sense
impossible or cannot be fully achieved. See Derrida (2000). 11 See Lundgren (2011).
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concerning the position taken here: it is not our purpose to
argue against hospital births, as should be clear from the
previous section. The result of our considerations was
merely to encourage imagining and give women freedom
of choice concerning their preferred place of childbirth.12
Secondly, our purpose in highlighting the significance of
passivity is not to somehow indicate that ‘‘doing nothing’’
would be the best attitude during birth. Rather, passivity is
an essential component of the experience, and for this
reason, it is helpful to consider how to deal with passivity.
Importantly, neither is passivity nothing, nor does it mean
doing nothing. Passivity is complex and multi-faceted, and
responding to an experience of passivity is quite difficult,
much more so than doing nothing. While passivity
describes a general attitude of ‘letting-be’ and applies to
childbirth as a whole, there is a more concrete part of
childbirth that requires passivity, but can also be prepared
for more concretely: waiting.
Waiting is crucially a temporal phenomenon, and our
body plays no intrinsic role in it.13 A general phe-
nomenology of waiting (as can obviously not be accom-
plished here) would begin with the difference between
objective time and phenomenological time, or clock-time
and time as experienced. Waiting generally designates that
time stretches, or that it passes painfully slowly. Ten
minutes of waiting always feel longer than ten minutes of a
normal activity. Even waiting for something exciting does
not change the fact that the flow of time is conceived as too
slow, expressed by the formulation ‘‘I can’t wait (for X to
happen)’’. On the other hand, if the event waited for causes
fear, there is nonetheless waiting as being obsessed with
the flow of time or its seemingly standing still. Birth will
normally involve both of those dimensions of waiting:
waiting with excitement for the baby, but also waiting with
fear for the further development of the process.
In waiting, time expands, and nothing in the world
provides a remedy. Nothing? In normal experiences of
waiting, we often wish we had brought a book, or a con-
versation suddenly provides distraction. During labour,
conversations are difficult and not very desirable. But other
forms of distraction can well be helpful especially during
the initial stages. It might indeed not be a bad idea to bring
a book.14 The more widespread response to a situation of
waiting is television. Many women indeed report having
spent some of the initial part of the birth process watching
TV (at home or in the hospital), and those who do not want
to be subject to the unpredictability of regular TV might
want to include the question of visual entertainment in their
preparatory imaginative engagement by sorting out a DVD,
etc. Of course, this depends on whether and what woman
likes to watch when discomforted.
Admittedly, the moment will come when distraction
through entertainment is no longer possible, and that is when
the body makes itself so present that a kind of Cartesian
mind–body-dualism becomes desirable. In other words,
there is a strong desire for body and mind to be detachable in
such a way that the body could be left, at least momentarily,
by that part of us which is responsible for thinking, feeling,
and experiencing. Of course, there is no experiencing with-
out body, and no thinking and feeling either, though the latter
might be less obvious. Pain thus undermines Cartesianism on
the level of experience rather than on the logical level, and it
undermines it exactly because dualism would be desirable in
such a moment yet remains all the more so impossible.
But how to best assist somebody who is facing an
inevitable yet uncanny experience, and one that involves
waiting and passivity? If the time of waiting has not robbed
the woman of all energy and determination, the final phase
becomes manageable exactly because it is clear that it is
the final phase. Therefore, creating conditions for ‘good
waiting’ and ‘good passivity’ is crucial. Others are crucial
in this respect because others affect us most. Others have
always already affected me and will continue to affect me.
Since birth is a particularly volatile situation, it is crucial to
understand better how others affect me, especially on the
level of care and communication.
Care and discourse
How can others best help us dealing with the affects in this
extra-ordinary situation? The current article proposes that
Heidegger’s philosophy is most helpful in this respect.
Both care and discourse are important dimensions when it
comes to the experience of birth. Midwifery is a care
profession. Starting from etymology (Latin cura) and
common sense understandings, Heidegger makes it clear
that the everyday notions of ‘concern’ or ‘worry’ will not
lead us to the primordial meaning of care. The deepest
meaning of care is ontologically so fundamental that it
12 In that sense, our conclusions coincide with Brocklehurst’s recom-
mendation, and it should indeed be noted that it takes financial, political,
and communal efforts to provide women with these choices.
13 The statement that the body plays no intrinsic role in waiting does
not exclude that the body might be important in certain experiences of
waiting (such as standing around and waiting); yet for a general
description of waiting as attempted here in its briefest form, the body
is not crucial because it does not always play a role in waiting. The
question as to whether time-consciousness does not inevitably need to
be embodied operates on a different level (namely, (phenomeno-)
logical necessity rather than experiential evidence).
14 Auto-ethnographic observation: I decided that the waiting process
during early stages of labour would call for a detective novel that
draws the reader in. My choice was Bernhard Schlink (Self’s
Punishment); he served me well.
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becomes synonymous with existence. Our existence is care
because our existence is an issue for us (Heidegger 1978,
p. 42); we do not just live our lives, but reflect on it.
While his overall sense of care refers to the world in
general and also our dealings with objects, they can be
shown as relevant for healthcare relations.15 For our pur-
poses, his considerations regarding Fu¨rsorge, ‘care-for’
(Heidegger 1978, p. 122), are particularly important. Hei-
degger explains that welfare and care professions become
necessary exactly because we for the most part do not
sufficiently care for each other, but live alongside each
other, treating each other like, or almost like, objects in the
world. In contrast to this indifference, there are two ‘pos-
itive modes’ of care, though ‘positive’ initially just means
that caring-for is happening, not that it is necessarily
happening in a positive or helpful fashion. The first, much
more common form of caring-for consists in ‘leaping in’
for the Other (einspringende Fu¨rsorge), taking the care
away from him or her (Heidegger 1978, p. 122). While this
may sound helpful especially on a misplaced understanding
of care as worry, it proves detrimental because it turns the
Other into somebody ‘‘who is dependent and dominated
even if this domination is a tacit one and remains hidden
from him/her’’ (ibid.). The second form of caring-for, in
contrast, means to ‘leap ahead’ of the Other (vorspringende
Fu¨rsorge), not taking his or her place, but giving the care
back to the Other. This caring-for treats the Other not as a
‘‘what which it takes care of’’ but strives to help the Other
‘‘to become transparent to himself [or herself] in his [or
her] care and free for it’’ (ibid.).
This distinction has direct implications for midwives
and health professionals helping in the birth process.
Although Heidegger certainly does not discuss this exam-
ple, it would be true to say that birth (just like anxiety)
individualises: nobody can give birth for me. Nonetheless,
the way in which the situation of birth creates a dependence
on others makes it tempting to wish that the Other could
‘leap in’ for me. Yet this leaping in cannot ultimately be
helpful. Once it feels like the process is out of my hands
and I no longer conceive of myself as the most crucial
participant, it becomes tempting to treat myself or think of
myself as a helpless object. Conceiving of myself as an
object is relatively easy, due to my split nature of being
subject/object which Heidegger, to avoid misunderstand-
ings easily created by this traditional terminology, re-
conceives as our being ‘thrown project’: I am thrown into
the world like an object, yet I am also a project of multiple
possibilities. Care means having to negotiate myself as
thrown project.
Abnormal states like sickness or pain easily create a
situation in which my self-perception changes in such a
way that I would like to distance myself from my body.
Pain is existentially threatening exactly because it makes
me aware that I am unable to escape. Being (rather than
having) a body means that existence is a ‘no way out’
situation, as far as my corporeality is concerned. As a
result, ‘leaping in’ care is particularly dangerous in the
health profession: the patient all too willingly accepts the
invitation to take further distance from the already alien-
ated body and expect for the Other to take over. While such
trust in professionals appears helpful in cases of sickness
where actual medical intervention is necessary, it can only
be helpful in childbirth if the situation indeed takes a turn
to the problematic and thus medical. For ‘normal’ birth,
‘leaping in’ creates problems since it will become obvious
quite soon that nobody can give birth for me; so I have to
accept this body back. Much more helpful and less frus-
trating is thus a form of care that ‘leaps ahead’, trying to
free myself for taking care of myself and helping me to
realise that the responsibility is indeed mine.
How can this best be achieved? Heidegger does not
provide precise guidelines, but it becomes obvious that it is
a matter of relational attitude. In order to examine my
relation to the other more closely and see how different
attitudes manifest themselves, it will be useful to invoke
the second major dimension of existence in which being-
with others happens: discourse (Rede).
Discourse is very significant in the healthcare profes-
sion. Before attending to some crucial moments of Hei-
degger’s analysis, I would like to give a few examples from
women who felt they had been failed by health profes-
sionals in childbirth. One woman reported: ‘‘I was more or
less an object, not a human being but something they had to
get something out of, nobody told me anything, nobody
said a word, no explanations nor any kind of information
whatsoever’’ (Lundgren 2011, p. 124). The communication
problems experienced by this woman are obvious; yet a
remedy to the situation is much less straightforward than it
may first seem. Simply speaking to women is not sufficient,
though it sounds as if the lack of speech was the biggest
issue in the account just given. But a different woman
reports: ‘‘they just told me how I was feeling’’ (Lundgren
2011, p. 141). This example shows how speech can itself
be quite patronising, like an extreme form of leaping in.
A brief example from my own experiences indicates
further how complex the situation is. The midwives who
had come to attend my homebirth kept asking me every
few minutes ‘How are you doing?’ A perfectly friendly,
everyday question, and indeed a question, not a patronising
form of discourse. Nonetheless, this intervention was
experienced by me as unhelpful after a short period of time
because the question was repeated over and over again,
15 The general implications of Heideggerian care for healthcare
relationships are explored in Mallia (2012), Mallia and Ten Have
(2003), and Svenaeus (2011).
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every few minutes. Initially, I responded ‘I’m okay, given
the circumstances’. Later, I just said ‘I’m okay’, then just
‘okay’. I realised that I did not want to be forced into the
land of words or verbal language every few minutes,
especially since there was not much to say and little need to
speak. The incessant questions turned me back into a
thinking and speaking subject when I wanted to settle into
the situation as a body, trying to feel out how to best be a
body under the circumstances: waiting, passive.
What is called for is thus a wider notion of discourse as
a mode of being with the other without relying solely on
words. Such a wider notion then also makes it possible to
integrate words and use them in a reassuring, supportive
rather than disruptive or even patronising fashion. Hei-
degger provides such a concept of discourse in section 34
of Being and Time. Three characteristics in particular are
worth noting, for our purposes. Firstly, Heidegger points
out that discourse is the foundation of language (Heidegger
1978, p. 161). Discourse, and thus the relation to others
whom we address (or refuse to address) is the more pri-
mordial phenomenon in comparison to verbal language.
Our usual restricted understanding of language as con-
cerned with conveying information comes about because
we do not acknowledge that verbal language is derivative
from discourse in the wider sense. This wider sense
includes gestures, mimics, sounds, etc. Secondly, Heideg-
ger insists that we never just hear sounds, but hear specific
entities, even though we might be mistaken about what
exactly we hear. We immediately give meaning to what we
hear; we make sense and are affected by this sense.
Especially in situations of vulnerability, this relation needs
to be considered. Thirdly, ‘‘hearing and keeping silent are
possibilities belonging to discoursing speech’’ (Heidegger
1978, p. 161). Silence is not a lack of speech, but a genuine
and very important dimension of discourse.
Listening to the Other and listening to the situation
means not being afraid of silence. If such discourse in the
wider sense is successful, it ‘‘brings about the ‘sharing’ of
being attuned together and of the understanding of being-
with’’ (Heidegger 1978, p. 162). As Heidegger also points
out, I cannot take the Other’s fear away by fearing for
them, but there can nonetheless be an understanding of how
the other is affected, and in that sense, a ‘sharing’ of
affects. This does not mean to take away the Other’s fears
and anxiety, but help them to not get overwhelmed by
them. ‘‘Listening to each other, in which being-with is
developed, has the possible ways of following, going along
with, and the privative modes of not hearing, opposition,
defying, turning away’’ (Heidegger 1978, p. 153).
What does this mean for birth-related discourse? Dis-
course is certainly not limited to the words that are being
spoken. Leaping-ahead care, for midwives, can consist in
breathing with the woman, nodding in support, providing
a massage if desired, giving support to the body: being-
with that goes beyond words. It is crucial for the midwife
to be there: da sein. Such a wider concept of discourse
could also be referred to as intercorporeality. Discourse
which involves silence, hearing, and letting-be allows the
woman to stay a ‘who’, that is, own up to being and
remaining a ‘who’ in the situation, even if she is not a
discourse partner in the ordinary sense.16 It means sup-
porting passivity rather than interrupting it, acknowledg-
ing the existential precariousness which makes even the
most ordinary mundane problem suddenly complex, and
listening to what the woman needs, no matter how diffi-
cult it may be for her to communicate it. Of course, the
emphasis placed here on silence is not meant as a cate-
gorical demand to be without words; midwives can also
speak to reassure as well as to inform, and that is
important. But equally significant are the willingness to
be silent and the understanding that a response from the
woman in labour should not be expected.
Conclusion
On the basis of the reflections on the experience of birth
and the challenges it poses for care and discourse, we can
conclude that the quality of care matters more than the
birth setting (home or hospital). While it is very useful to
have homebirth available as an option for those women
whose fear of the unfamiliar is alleviated by the home
context and especially for those who are not giving birth
for the first time, homebirth is not for everybody. Some
women feel more reassured by the hospital context when
it comes to an unfamiliar experience, and it should also
be noted that nobody can anticipate how they will feel
and experience their own bodies in such an extra-ordinary
situation. Efforts to make the hospital more home-like and
increase privacy are thus a crucial contribution. Yet even
more important is the focus on the quality of care because
as human beings, we are most affected by our relations to
other humans, especially in a situation that is uncanny and
in which we are dependent on the help of others.
Reflections on discourse, listening, care, and compassion
are thus very important (and should ideally play a key
role in midwives’ training and professional
development).17
16 The significance and difficulty of staying a ‘who’ emerges when
women report negative experiences in which it felt like the process
was happening without them: ‘‘Mentally, I was totally finished. I
really wasn’t there any more’’ (reported in Ayers 2007, p. 258).
17 We have developed an i-learn module to that effect for the Royal
College of Midwives, entitled Communicating Well. Philosophy for
Midwives.
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Being with somebody who is undergoing an experience
of uncanniness and passivity requires compassion.18 My
relationship to the Other does not necessarily require for
me to project how I would feel in the situation of giving
birth; rather, it can arise from the realisation that this sit-
uation is a special challenge. This challenge is always
experienced in a unique way and yet such that some
structural characteristics such as uncanniness and passivity
can be identified. The description of the birth experience
provided here has confirmed the crucial role of midwives
and other health professionals who help the birth-giving
process. Initially, there might be clashes: between the
woman facing a radically strange and inconceivable
experience, and the midwife to whom such experiences are
normal events (and who comes herself as a stranger). Being
with the Other in this kind of situation requires being there
for them in such a way as to not leap in but leap ahead,
liberating the Other to undergo this unimaginable yet
possible experience of uncanniness and wonder. Liberating
the Other through care means listening to their imagined
birth scenario and trying to accommodate them whenever
possible, including choice of birth place. But it also
involves inspiring their imagination by giving them more
options, outlining choices in terms of places and positions,
without being offended if these options are not taken up.
It means trying to make the Other comfortable in the
midst of uncanniness, passivity, and waiting. This is a
tremendously difficult task, and one that involves knowing
how to be there for the Other with and without words. It
involves patience, silence, listening, flexibility, and other
modes of being with the Other by being there for them. But
if the midwife establishes successful care relations via
discourse in the wider sense developed here, she might
actually be experienced as an angel of sorts who comes as a
guide or guardian in the encounter with the uncanny and
makes the seemingly impossible possible.
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